"We
are a nation", they claimed in the ever eloquent words of the Quaid-i-Azam- "We
are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and
literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and
proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and
tradition, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive
outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law, we are a
nation". The formulation of the Muslim demand for Pakistan in 1940 had a
tremendous impact on the nature and course of Indian politics. On the one hand,
it shattered for ever the Hindu dreams of a pseudo-Indian, in fact, Hindu empire
on British exit from India: on the other, it heralded an era of Islamic
renaissance and creativity in which the Indian Muslims were to be active
participants. The Hindu reaction was quick, bitter, malicious. Equally hostile
were the British to the Muslim demand, their hostility having stemmed from their
belief that the unity of India was their main achievement and their foremost
contribution. The irony was that both the Hindus and the British had not
anticipated the astonishingly tremendous response that the Pakistan demand had
elicited from the Muslim masses. Above all, they felid to realize how a hundred
million people had suddenly become supremely conscious of their distinct
nationhood and their high destiny. In channeling the course of Muslim politics
towards Pakistan, no less than in directing it towards its consummation in the
establishment of Pakistan in 1947, non played a more decisive role than did
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It was his powerful advocacy of the case of
Pakistan and his remarkable strategy in the delicate negotiations, that followed
the formulation of the Pakistan demand, particularly in the post-war period,
that made Pakistan inevitable.
Cripps Scheme While
the British reaction to the Pakistan demand came in the form of the Cripps offer
of April, 1942, which conceded the principle of self-determination to provinces
on a territorial basis, the Rajaji Formula (called after the eminent Congress
leader C.Rajagopalacharia, which became the basis of prolonged Jinnah-Gandhi
talks in September, 1944), represented the Congress alternative to Pakistan. The
Cripps offer was rejected because it did not concede the Muslim demand the whole
way, while the Rajaji Formula was found unacceptable since it offered a
"moth-eaten, mutilated" Pakistan and the too appended with a plethora of
pre-conditions which made its emergence in any shape remote, if not altogether
impossible. Cabinet Mission The most delicate as well as the most tortuous
negotiations, however, took place during 1946-47, after the elections which
showed that the country was sharply and somewhat evenly divided between two
parties- the Congress and the League- and that the central issue in Indian
politics was Pakistan. These negotiations began with the arrival, in March 1946,
of a three-member British Cabinet Mission. The crucial task with which the
Cabinet Mission was entrusted was that of devising in consultation with the
various political parties, a constitution-making machinery, and of setting up a
popular interim government. But, because the Congress-League gulf could not be
bridged, despite the Mission's (and the Viceroy's) prolonged efforts, the
Mission had to make its own proposals in May, 1946. Known as the Cabinet Mission
Plan, these proposals stipulated a limited centre, supreme only in foreign
affairs, defense and communications and three autonomous groups of provinces.
Two of these groups were to have Muslim majorities in the north-west and the
north-east of the subcontinent, while the third one, comprising the Indian
mainland, was to have a Hindu majority. A consummate statesman that he was,
Jinnah saw his chance. He interpreted the clauses relating to a limited centre
and the grouping as "the foundation of Pakistan", and induced the Muslim League
Council to accept the Plan in June 1946; and this he did much against the
calculations of the Congress and to its utter dismay. Tragically though, the
League's acceptance was put down to its supposed weakness and the Congress put
up a posture of defiance, designed to swamp the League into submitting to its
dictates and its interpretations of the plan. Faced thus, what alternative had
Jinnah and the League but to rescind their earlier acceptance, reiterate and
reaffirm their original stance, and decide to launch direct action (if need be)
to wrest Pakistan. The way Jinnah maneuvered to turn the tide of events at a
time when all seemed lost indicated, above all, his masterly grasp of the
situation and his adeptness at making strategic and tactical moves. Partition
Plan By the close of 1946, the communal riots had flared up to murderous
heights, engulfing almost the entire subcontinent. The two peoples, it seemed,
were engaged in a fight to the finish. The time for a peaceful transfer of power
was fast running out. Realizing the gravity of the situation. His Majesty's
Government sent down to India a new Viceroy- Lord Mountbatten. His protracted
negotiations with the various political leaders resulted in 3 June.(1947) Plan
by which the British decided to partition the subcontinent, and hand over power
to two successor States on 15 August, 1947. The plan was duly accepted by the
three Indian parties to the dispute- the Congress the League and the Alkali
Daly(representing the Sikhs).
Leader of a Free Nation In
recognition of his singular contribution, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was
nominated by the Muslim League as the Governor-General of Pakistan, while the
Congress appointed Mountbatten as India's first Governor-General. Pakistan, it
has been truly said, was born in virtual chaos. Indeed, few nations in the world
have started on their career with less resources and in more treacherous
circumstances. The new nation did not inherit a central government, a capital,
an administrative core, or an organized defense force. Its social and
administrative resources were poor; there was little equipment and still less
statistics. The Punjab holocaust had left vast areas in a shambles with
communications disrupted. This, along with the en masse migration of the Hindu
and Sikh business and managerial classes, left the economy almost shattered. The
treasury was empty, India having denied Pakistan the major share of its cash
balances. On top of all this, the still unorganized nation was called upon to
feed some eight million refugees who had fled the insecurities and barbarities
of the north Indian plains that long, hot summer. If all this was symptomatic of
Pakistan's administrative and economic weakness, the Indian annexation, through
military action in November 1947, of Junagadh (which had originally acceded to
Pakistan) and the Kashmir war over the State's accession (October 1947-December
1948) exposed her military weakness. In the circumstances, therefore, it was
nothing short of a miracle that Pakistan survived at all. That it survived and
forged ahead was mainly due to one man-Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The nation
desperately needed in the person of a charismatic leader at that critical
juncture in the nation's history, and he fulfilled that need profoundly. After
all, he was more than a mere Governor-General: he was the Quaid-e-Azam who had
brought the State into being. In the ultimate analysis, his very presence at the
helm of affairs was responsible for enabling the newly born nation to overcome
the terrible crisis on the morrow of its cataclysmic birth. He mustered up the
immense prestige and the unquestioning loyalty he commanded among the people to
energize them, to raise their morale, land directed the profound feelings of
patriotism that the freedom had generated, along constructive channels. Though
tired and in poor health, Jinnah yet carried the heaviest part of the burden in
that first crucial year. He laid down the policies of the new state, called
attention to the immediate problems confronting the nation and told the members
of the Constituent Assembly, the civil servants and the Armed Forces what to do
and what the nation expected of them. He saw to it that law and order was
maintained at all costs, despite the provocation that the large-scale riots in
north India had provided. He moved from Karachi to Lahore for a while and
supervised the immediate refugee problem in the Punjab. In a time of fierce
excitement, he remained sober, cool and steady. He advised his excited audence
in Lahore to concentrate on helping the refugees, to avoid retaliation, exercise
restraint and protect the minorities. He assured the minorities of a fair deal,
assuaged their inured sentiments, and gave them hope and comfort. He toured the
various provinces, attended to their particular problems and instilled in the
people a sense of belonging. He reversed the British policy in the North-West
Frontier and ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the tribal territory of
Waziristan, thereby making the Pathos feel themselves an integral part of
Pakistan's body-politics. He created a new Ministry of States and Frontier
Regions, and assumed responsibility for ushering in a new era in Balochistan. He
settled the controversial question of the states of Karachi, secured the
accession of States, especially of Kalat which seemed problematical and carried
on negotiations with Lord Mountbatten for the settlement of the Kashmir
Issue.
